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 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is the invariable starting point for UK 
constitutional theory. It is also the inevitable stumbling block when it comes to civil 
liberties and individual rights. Although the Human Rights Act 1998 has had a 
significant impact on administrative law, by altering the balance of power between 
public bodies and the courts, it has not significantly strengthened the constitutional 
protection of rights and liberties in the UK. Its lack of legal entrenchment renders 
it vulnerable to future change. Moreover, the UK courts interpret neither the 
common law nor the ECHR to protect freedom of speech as ‘the matrix, the 
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom’.1 This reluctance 
creates a normative space for another concept, like democratic legitimacy, to take 
root.  
 Democracy is, of course, a multifarious concept. It ‘lacks a clear narrative line 
and conspicuously fails to carry its own meaning clearly on the surface’.2 It also loses 
its value if it is reduced to its literal meaning. Conversely, the temptation to open 
the concept up to endless contestation or to over-burden it with substantive goals 
must also be resisted. The added value of democracy as a concept in constitutional 
discourse only becomes apparent if it can be presented as the conceptual starting 
point or the ‘indispensable condition’ on which the viability of all other 
constitutional concepts, including parliamentary sovereignty, depend. As Sartori 
notes: 
 
Up until the 1940s people knew what democracy was and either liked it or 
rejected it; since then we all claim to like democracy but no longer know 
(understand, agree) what it is. We characteristically live, then, in an age of 
confused democracy. That “democracy” obtains several meanings is something we 
can live with. But if “democracy” can mean just anything, that is too much.3 
 
If democracy cannot mean anything, it must still mean something. I will use this 
article to explore three questions. First, in what situation does the absence of a 
concrete understanding of democracy become an inescapable problem for 
constitutional law? Second, to what extent are the existing constitutional models 
democratically deficient? Third, what precisely must democracy prescribe as the 
indispensable condition for political legitimacy?  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 Palko v Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 327 (1937), per Cardozo J. 
2 J Dunne, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005) p 137. 
3 G Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited I (Chatham N.J.: Chatham House, 1987) p 6. 
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THE INESCAPABLE PROBLEM 
 
In this section I will identify three categories that illustrate the problems that stem 
from an absolutist conception of parliamentary sovereignty. The normative gap that 
a legal conception of democracy could close becomes apparent only in the final 
category. The first category consists of largely hypothetical and absurd examples. 
They imagine legislation that condemns all red-haired males to death,4 requires the 
killing of ‘all blue eyed babies’,5 or disenfranchises or discriminates against a 
particular group on arbitrary grounds.6 Lord Hope summarily dismissed these 
examples as unhelpful: ‘Parliamentary sovereignty is an empty principle if legislation 
is passed which is so absurd or so unacceptable that the populace at large refuses to 
recognise it as law’.7 
  Most scholars prefer to dismiss such examples as ‘unlikely, immoral or 
undesirable things which no one wishes it to do’.8 In truth, a state that mandated 
the killing of blue-eyed babies would not be a legitimate state, let alone a democratic 
one. It would, in common parlance, be a rogue or a failed state. For that reason, 
these examples do not even begin to address substantive questions of democracy.  
  The second category involves violations of civil liberties with a national security 
or public safety dimension. Within this category are high-profile speech cases, such 
as Tisdall,9 Ponting,10 Spycatcher,11 and Shayler,12 which involve criminal proceedings in 
the context of secrets, spies, and whistleblowers.13 Other examples within this 
category involve indefinite detention, arbitrary arrests, broad police powers, data 
retention and surveillance powers. These examples challenge a state committed to 
civil liberties and the rule of law, i.e. the technical administrative law language of 
rationality, proportionality, and ECHR-compliancy. They clearly also have 
implications for the democratic quality of a state. The House of Lords Constitution 
Committee, for instance, recognised that the erosion of privacy ‘weakens the 
                                                      
4 AW Bradley, KD Ewing & CJS Knight, Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Pearson, 16th 
edn, 2015) p 73. 
5 This particular favourite has been around since the days of L Stephen, The Science of Ethics (London: 
Smith, Elder & Co., 1882) p 132, and AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(Macmillan, London, 10th edn, 1959) p 79. See now: M Elliott, ‘Legislative Supremacy in a Multidimensional 
Constitution’, in M Elliott and D Feldman (eds) The Cambridge Companion to Public Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015) p 74; A Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 
(Oxford: Hart, 2009) pp 2-15, 32-33; M Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: 
Process, Politics and Democracy (Oxford: Hart, 2015) p 145; TRS Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, 
Constitution, and Common Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) pp 18, 120, 141–43, 296.  
6 See examples in (R)Jackson v Her Majesty’s Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, Lord Steyn at [102]; Baroness 
Hale at [159]; and D Oliver, ‘Parliament and the Courts: A Pragmatic (or Principled) Defence of the 
Sovereignty of Parliament’ in A. Horne et al (eds) Parliament and the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2013) pp 314-
315. 
7 Jackson v Attorney General, above n 6, at [120]. 
8 Bradley, Ewing & Knight, above n 4, p 73. 
9 Secretary of State for Defence v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1984] Ch 156, CA. 
10 R v Ponting [1985] Crim LR 318. 
11 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No.1) [1987] UKHL 13 [1987] 3 All E.R. 316. 
12 R.v Shayler [2002] UKHL 11 [2003] 1 AC 247. 
13 ‘Secrets, Spies, and Whistleblowers: Freedom of Expression and National Security in the United 
Kingdom’ Article 19 and Liberty (London: The Guardian, November 2000). 
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constitutional foundations on which democracy and good governance have 
traditionally been based in this country’.14 But these examples do not determine the 
democratic quality of a state: even a non-democratic state can desist from torture, 
respect due process, and protect privacy.15 
  The third and final category involves violations of civil liberties without a 
security or safety dimension. The first few years after the HRA came into force saw 
the cases of Percy,16 Norwood,17 and Hammond.18 These cases were picked up by civil 
liberties scholars because in each of these cases the individual’s right to free 
expression had been restricted on ground of a pressing social need.19 Hammond 
involved a street preacher in Bournemouth who held up a sign bearing the words 
‘Stop Immorality’, ‘Stop Homosexuality’, and ‘Stop Lesbianism’, but who did not 
incite violence. Mr Hammond was arrested, charged, and fined (upheld on appeal) 
for an offence under s 5 Public Order Act 1986. The court found that the link 
between homosexuality, lesbianism, and immorality was capable of being insulting 
and of causing harassment, alarm, or distress to a person standing nearby.  
  To be sure, the law has changed since the triplet of Percy, Norwood, and Hammond 
were decided. The wording of s 5 at the time made it an offence to use ‘threatening, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour’ or to display ‘any 
writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or 
insulting’ within the hearing or sight of a person ‘likely to be caused harassment, 
alarm or distress thereby’. After a high profile campaign and a governmental defeat 
in the House of Lords, s 57 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 removed the word 
‘insulting’ in ss 5(1) and 6(4) of the Public Order Act 1986: the crime now requires 
‘threatening or abusive’ words or behaviour. According to the CPS, ‘the amendment 
is intended to enhance the protection of the right to freedom of expression under 
Art 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)’.20 It might 
therefore be claimed that cases like Hammond would not be decided the same way 
today. However, three notes of caution need to be inserted.  
  First, both s 4(1) (fear or provocation of violence) and s 4A(1) (intentional 
harassment, alarm or distress) of the Public Order Act 1986 continue to proscribe 
                                                      
14 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Surveillance: Citizens and the State, HL 18-I (report), citation 
at [14], and HL 18-II (evidence), 6 February 2009. 
15 E Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) pp 45-46, 
88-89, 95. 
16 Percy v DPP [2001] EWHC 1125 (Admin). 
17 Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin).  
18 Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin).  
19 J Weinstein, ‘Extreme Speech, Public Order, and Democracy: Lessons from The Masses’, in I Hare and J 
Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); A Bailin, 
‘Criminalising free speech?’ (2011) 9 Crim L R pp 705-711; A Geddis, ‘Free Speech Martyrs or 
Unreasonable Threats to Social Peace? - “Insulting” Expression and Section 5 of the Public Order Act 
1986’ [2003] PL 853- 874; D Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest: Rights and Regulation in the Human 
Rights Act Era (Oxford: Hart, 2010) pp 224-230. 
20 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/#Section_5 [last accessed: May 2017]. 
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‘insulting’ behaviour. In other words, where the insulting words or behaviour are 
planned and malicious, a person could still be guilty of a criminal offence.  
  Second, a court can still punish identical conduct as ‘abusive’. After the 
government agreed to amend s 5, the then Home Secretary Theresa May told MPs: 
 
Looking at past cases, the Director of Public Prosecutions could not identify 
any where the behaviour leading to a conviction could not be described as 
“abusive” as well as “insulting”. He has stated that “the word ‘insulting’ could 
safely be removed without the risk of undermining the ability of the CPS to 
bring prosecutions.21 
 
To illustrate this point, in Abdul v DPP22 the Crown Court had convicted the 
defendants of a s 5 Public Order Act 1986 offence. The protesters in question had 
shouted ‘burn in hell’, ‘murderers’, and ‘baby killers’ at soldiers returning home from 
Iraq. On appeal to the High Court, the question was whether their conviction for 
these utterances was compatible with Art 10 ECHR. It is of interest that the soldiers 
themselves were not bothered ‘one jot’ by the protesters,23 and that the police made 
their arrests not during the demonstration but only months later after having 
reviewed film footage of the events. Nonetheless, the High Court found that ‘the 
words shouted by the defendants were both abusive and insulting’.24 The first 
instance judge had, according to Gross LJ, carefully balanced freedom of expression 
against ‘a very clear threat to public order’,25 and reached the right conclusion that 
prosecution was a proportionate response.26 Davis J added the freedoms of 
expression and assembly are subject to ‘duties and responsibilities’.27 Both judges 
agree that the defendants’ actions had gone ‘well beyond legitimate expressions of 
protest’.28 
  Third, even without s 5 POA, prosecutors have access to ample legislative 
provisions to deal with ‘public order’ and ‘communication’ offences.29 Section 
127(1)(a) Communications Act 2003 creates an offence if three conditions are met: 
i) a message; ii) that is grossly offensive; iii) is sent by means of a public electronic 
communications network. Lord Bingham helpfully sets out the legislative history of 
the provision in DPP v Collins.30 The purpose of the provision is to prohibit the 
sending of a grossly offensive communication via a public communications service. 
A letter that was personally delivered through a letterbox would, accordingly, not 
                                                      
21 House of Commons, Hansard debates, 14 January 2013, column 642. 
22 Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 (Admin). 
23 Ibid. at [19]. 
24 Ibid. at [29] per Gross LJ (emphasis added). 
25 Ibid. at [52]. 
26 Ibid. at [50]. 
27 Ibid. at [55]. 
28 Ibid. at [52] and [60]. 
29 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/, and 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_offences/#an11/ [last accessed: May 2017]. 
30 DPP v Collins [2006] UKHL 40; (2006) 4 All ER 602 at [6]. 
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fall within this legislation – although it may be covered by s.1 Malicious 
Communications Act 1988.  
  The majority of cases dealing with bullies, trolls, and stalkers on social media 
websites involve s 127.31 In an attempt to stem the rise of s 127 prosecutions, the 
then DPP Keir Starmer issued guidelines in 2012, which sought to establish a high 
threshold for launching criminal action against spontaneously written digital 
communications. Most notably, he made the following statement on the nature of 
offence: 
 
The distinction [between offensive and grossly offensive] is an important one 
and not easily made. Context and circumstances are highly relevant and as the 
European Court of Human Rights observed in the case of Handyside v UK 
(1976), the right to freedom of expression includes the right to say things or 
express opinions “that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the 
population”.32 
 
But mere guidelines do not resolve the issue, especially when the issue relates to the 
clarity, certainty, and predictability of the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression. How strong is the protection of speech in the UK? Is it possible to 
identify ‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials’?33 
  The notion that free speech is ‘bred in the bone of common law’,34 or that 
‘people are free to say and print what they like’ at common law,35 is disputable. It 
clearly did not apply to Mr Lemon, who was prosecuted for blasphemy at English 
common law in the 1970s,36 or Mr Hammond.37 In any event, trial courts usually 
refer to Art 10 ECHR (freedom of expression). The potency of Art 10 ECHR, 
however, is destabilised by a number of qualifications, including interests of national 
security, territorial integrity, public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, the 
protection of health or morals, and the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others. Legal stability is further undermined when trial courts invert the operation 
of Art 10 ECHR, as happened in Hammond and Abdul. Instead of recognising the 
                                                      
31 L Edwards, ‘Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003: Threat or Menace?’ LSE Media Policy Project 
blog, 19 October 2012.  
32 DPP statement on Tom Daley case and social media prosecutions, 20 September 2012. 
33 New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 270, per Justice Black. 
34 R v Criminal Central Court, ex parte Bright [2000] EWHC 560 (QB), [2001] 2 All ER 244 at [87], per Judge 
LJ. 
35 K Ewing, The Bonfire of the Liberties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 138. 
36 R v Lemon [1979] QB 10, CA; upheld on appeal [1979] AC 617, HL. 
37 See generally E Barendt, ‘Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom under the Human Rights Act 
1998’ (2009) 84(3) Indiana LJ 851-866, 851: ‘English law has traditionally taken little or no notice of 
freedom of speech. A right to free speech (or expression) was not generally recognized by the common law 
…’. 
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individual’s right to expression, which ought to persist unless and until the state can 
justify a limitation, the courts began by asking whether the defendant’s conduct was 
insulting and likely to harass, annoy or distress bystanders. If that was the case, the 
courts asked a second question, namely whether the conduct might nonetheless 
have been ‘reasonable’ or ‘legitimate’ under Art 10 ECHR. By erroneously 
privileging public peacefulness over freedom of expression, criminal convictions 
have been presented as a necessary limit on the right to speak under Art 10(2) 
ECHR. Davis J casual remark in Abdul v DPP, that s 5 Public Order Act 1986 is 
‘obviously… compatible with the Convention’,38 is symptomatic of that approach. 
However, the more important question is whether the criminalisation of behaviour 
that is not of itself violent, but is threatening, abusive, insulting or disorderly, is also 
necessary in a democratic society. 
  Freedom of expression is not only vital as an individual right, but as a 
constitutive element of democratic society. According to Weale, the values of 
democracy values are ‘best understood in terms of the protection and promotion of 
common interests constrained by political equality and in conditions of human 
fallibility’.39 In that context, the common interest commands possibilities for dissent 
and difference: ‘dissent does not undermine a society but underpins it’.40 A legal 
concept democracy must, therefore, guarantee free speech – not as a 
constitutionally-guaranteed individual right, but as a political or public right, and as 
a condition of democratic legitimacy.  
  Unfortunately, as we have seen, UK courts have tended not to approach 
freedom of expression of individual dissenters with the same degree of principle 
and conviction as, say, First Amendment jurisprudence in the USA. Domestic 
courts view deeply inflammatory speech as pernicious, and as promoting distrust, 
suspicion, and violence between different social groups. They have indiscriminately 
constrained or criminalised the articulation of offensive and extremist ideas that fall 
short of criminal incitement. The cases discussed above are not isolated ones. Philip 
Johnston’s opening chapter starts with the striking claim that ‘more people are being 
jailed or arrested in Britain today for what they think, believe and say than at any 
time since the eighteenth century’.41 Brice Dickson claims that the attitude of the 
House of Lords and UK Supreme Court towards freedom of expression ‘cannot be 
regarded as particularly fervent’. He attributes this to the absence of constitutional 
guarantees as well as to ‘a strain of conservatism on the part of judges in our top 
court, most of whom do not seem to view free speech as deserving of extra-special 
protection.’42 Eric Barendt finds no evidence that the HRA has radically altered the 
legal protection of free speech, and little evidence that UK courts treat freedom of 
expression ‘as the starting point; they have not always asked whether the restrictions 
                                                      
38 Abdul v DPP at [55]. 
39 A Weale, Democracy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edn, 2007) pp xviii-xix.  
40 N Bobbio, The Future of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) p 60. 
41 P Johnston, Feel Free to Say It: Threats to Freedom of Speech in Britain Today (London: Civitas, 2013) 
p 7. 
42 B Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013) p 280. 
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on its exercise were necessary to safeguard public order or the other end for which 
they were imposed’.43 James Weinstein concludes that the English right to free 
speech ‘is both too weak and too indeterminate to adequately protect the public 
expression of ideas that “offend, shock or disturb” dominant opinion’.44 This state 
of affairs should be of concern not only to anyone with an interest in constitutional 
law, but also to anyone with an interest in democracy and legitimacy.  
  The next two sections will reveal the democracy deficit in the two rival 
constitutional models. The UK’s constitutional traditions, concepts, and vocabulary 
developed to describe a functioning, balanced, and liberal constitution. Ideas of 
democracy and universal freedom were ‘invariably not forged afresh but rather 
tentatively grafted onto a pre-existing society that had been designed for the few’.45 
Although the origin of nineteenth century concepts, such as ‘sovereignty’, 
‘constitution’, ‘rule of law’, ‘judicial review’, and ‘separation of powers’, is pre-
democratic, they complement our understanding of democracy today: an Act of 
Parliament is the highest source of law, and everyone is subject to the same laws 
that are interpreted by an independent judiciary. But that still leaves a gap in relation 
to the recognition of basic rights in terms of ‘democratic legitimacy’, the common 
good, or ‘political’ and ‘public’ rights. The literature on UK constitutional law does 
not usually assess legitimacy with reference to such specifically democratic criteria. 
The two main models are both culpable for not adapting constitutional theory to fit 
the requirements of a modern democratic state.  
 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIENCY I:  
THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION 
 
The Westminster model of government encapsulates the so-called political 
constitution.46 This model conceives of democracy as electoral representation, 
which is ordinarily deemed to legitimise all parliamentary legislation. The political 
constitution is rooted in the nineteenth-century concept of representative or 
parliamentary government. Its central presuppositions, such as the continuing 
sovereignty of Parliament, a procedural conception of the rule of law, and basic civil 
liberties pre-date the arrival of mass democracy. They reached their high point 
during the late Victorian constitution. Ultimate legal authority was still divided 
amongst the three estates of Parliament, and the franchise, although extended, was 
                                                      
43 Barendt, above n 37, p 866. 
44 Weinstein, above n 19, p 37.  
45 C Gearty, Liberty and Security (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013) p 4. 
46 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1; A Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political 
Constitution’ (2002) 22(1) OJLS 157-175; R Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of 
the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); G Webber and G Gee, 
‘What Is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30 OJLS 273; Special Issue in (2013) 14 German LJ No. 12. 
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not yet universal. Although civil liberties expanded ratione personae, they remained 
fragile ratione materiae due to their lack of constitutional entrenchment.47 ‘There are 
not, under English domestic law, any fundamental constitutional rights that are 
immune from legislative change’.48  
  Anthony Bradley noted accurately in 2011 that the debates based on the model 
of the political constitution still revolve around a static and immutable 
understanding of parliamentary sovereignty and a subordinate role for the courts.49 
The conceptual starting point remains strikingly absolutist and gives rise to a 
legitimate concern about potentially oppressive and undemocratic outcomes: the 
legal principle of sovereignty by which Parliament provides unconstrained legal 
authority for governmental policy choices50 is connected to the ‘political principle 
that in a democracy there should be no legal limit to the wishes of the people’.51  
  This absolutist premise requires scrutiny. The legal principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty was born in the seventeenth century prior to the advent of mass 
democracy. As Bernard Manin notes, universal suffrage expanded the body of the 
electorate without transforming the undemocratic nature of the constitution: ‘there 
has been no significant change in the institutions regulating the selection of 
representatives and the influence of the popular will on their decisions once in 
office’.52 The purpose of the Reform Acts of 1832, 1867, and 1884 was to resist the 
kinds of democracy sought by Radicals and Chartists by focussing reform on 
parliamentary procedure and electoral districts.53 Ironically, parliamentary 
sovereignty received a boost by the growth in franchise to the surprise of many 
observers who were sceptical as to its operation under universal suffrage.54 Popular 
sovereignty was effectively absorbed by and channelled through Parliament. This 
had two consequences. First, the entire reform process from 1832 onwards occurred 
in the name of parliamentary government, which ‘fostered the conviction or 
delusion that the will of the nation could be expressed only through elected 
representatives’.55 Second, with a more inclusive franchise, democracy became a 
                                                      
47 KD Ewing and CA Gearty, Freedom under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in Modern Britain (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1990); and The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain 1914-
1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
48 R (Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 29, [2005] 1 WLR 1681 at [92], per Lord 
Scott.  
49 A Bradley, ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament – Form or Substance?’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds) The 
Changing Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2011) pp 67-68. 
50 G Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) p 41. 
51 K.D. Ewing, ‘The Resilience of the Political Constitution’ [2013] 14(12) German Law Journal 2111-2136, 
p 2118; Gordon, above n 5, pp 42, 46. 
52 B Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
p 236. 
53 N Gash, ‘The Social and Political Background to the Three British Nineteenth Century Reform Acts’ in 
AM Birke and K Kluxen (eds) British and German Parliamentarism (München: K.G. Saur, 1985).  
54 See MJ Horwitz, ‘Why is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical?’ (1997) 17 OJLS 551-586, p 561: 
‘if the central question for Blackstone is how to reconcile the rule of law with parliamentary supremacy, the 
central question for all legal thinkers after the French Revolution is how a theory of parliamentary 
supremacy will work under a regime of universal suffrage’. 
55 AV Dicey Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth 
Century (London: Macmillan, 1905) p 42.  
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convenient concept for the ruling elites who appropriated and contained the 
concept in order to ‘counteract the illusion that any random act was now possible’.56 
But it was too late. In the UK at least, parliamentary sovereignty was now so 
powerful that it became associated with a variant of absolute power that gave rise 
to concerns about ‘elective despotism’, a ‘plebiscitary dictatorship’,57 and Parliament 
‘legibus solutum’.58  
  The absence of normative benchmarks to constrain the omnipotent Parliament 
is also ‘unfortunately absolutely characteristic of English writing on constitutional 
law’.59 Constitutional law, in spite of its common usage, is ‘not a technical phrase of 
English law’.60 It is silent on governing principles underlying the constitution,61 it 
does not address questions regarding the social foundations of law’s legitimacy,62 
and it lacks the higher law quality of modern constitutional documents. The core of 
the political constitution has not changed since De Lolme wrote that ‘the legislature 
can change the constitution, as God created the light’.63 To this premise were added 
the nineteenth century desiderata of representative and parliamentary government. 
This was followed by the twentieth century view that a constitution should foster 
political opportunities for individuals on formally equal terms through the processes 
of representation and effective participation with the purpose of promoting sound 
governmental decisions.64 The democratic process, narrowly conceived, allows the 
                                                      
56 N Luhmann, Die Politik der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000) p 97. 
57 A Hamilton, J Jay, and J Madison, The Federalist (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 4th ed, 1974) No. 48; Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy: Diagnosis and 
Prescription (London: Collins, 1978) pp 9-11, 20-1; F Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London: 
Routledge, 1982) 348. 
58 CH McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1910) p 375.  
59 E Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p 5.  
60 FW Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908) p 
527. 
61 S Sedley, ‘The Sound of Silence: Constitutional Law Without a Constitution’ (1994) 110 LQR 270-291, 
270. 
62 R Cotterell, Law’s Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 
p 243. 
63 JL De Lolme, The Constitution of England, or, An Account of the English Government in which it is 
Compared both with the Republican Form of Government and the other Monarchies in Europe (London: 
G.G.J. & J. Robinson, 1784), Book II, Ch.3. 
64 See C Turpin and A Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 7th edn, 2011) pp 49-58; A Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon Law, 2003) p 6; CR 
Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2005) pp 89-90; E Wicks, 
The Evolution of a Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2006) pp 76-81; P Leyland, The Constitution of the United 
Kingdom (Oxford: Hart, 2012) pp 3-4; J Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp 9-13; S Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model 
of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2013) p 21; J Raz 
‘Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy’ in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 
p 117. For exceptions see Barendt, above n 61, pp 21-25; I Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, 
and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2015) pp 4-9; J Morison, ‘Models of 
Democracy: From Representation to Participation’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds) The Changing 
Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th edn, 2004); PP Craig, Public Law and Democracy in 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 
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electorate ‘to turn out any government that it does not like’.65 For Bellamy, that 
‘democratic process is the constitution’.66 In other words, the constitutional view of 
democracy is purely procedural. But as Ewing acknowledges, the democratic 
process is not the same as a democratic constitution.67 
  The political constitution and the Westminster model of government prioritise 
the source of the decision and presume the legitimacy of majoritarian decision-
making. Contrary to the central tenets of Western constitutional theory nothing is 
protected from the ordinary legislative processes, and everything is ‘up for grabs’.68 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy looks favourably upon the unlimited nature of the political 
constitution: ‘[procedurally] democratic decision-making is facilitated, and 
reasonably just statutes are enacted’.69 Richard Bellamy takes the same view on 
democratic rule: ‘the demos should be free to redefine the nature of their democracy 
whenever they want and not be tied to any given definition.’70 Intricate questions 
about justice and human rights are, therefore, not to be resolved by recourse to first 
principles, but by the ‘opinion of a majority of the people of those elected to 
represent them’.71 The principal remedy lies in ministerial responsibility to 
Parliament, which in the late Victorian age still conformed to the Burkean ideal of 
a lower house with independently-minded MPs, but which today has been 
transformed by party discipline and the whip system.72 
  Even Stephen Gardbaum’s synthetic account of a ‘third model’ of 
constitutionalism ultimately rests on a purely procedural conception of democracy 
that assigns ultimate decision-making power to ordinary majority vote in the 
legislature.73 He views as ‘compelling’ the argument that a legislative majority should 
‘trump’ the views of a judicial majority. The political constitution regards the 
enactment of oppressive and undemocratic legislation as repugnant only to ‘moral 
principle’.74 The legitimacy question has always been brushed off as a non-issue. 
Extreme cases have been kept at bay by ‘the sweet reasonableness of MPs and their 
                                                      
65 Griffith, above n 46, pp 1-21, 3, 16: ‘political decisions should be taken by politicians. In a society like 
ours this means by people who are removable’. I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London: 
University of London Press, 1959) p 173; Bellamy, above n 46, p 90. 
66 Bellamy, above n 46, p 5.  
67 Ewing, above n 53, p 2116. 
68 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) pp 302-312; Tomkins, above 
n 66, p 23.  
69 Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) p 269. 
70 Bellamy, above n 46, p 90. 
71 Goldsworthy, above n 64, p 10. 
72 A Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) Ch.5.  
73 S Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp 36, 67. 
74 See e.g. Bradley, Ewing, and Knight, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 55; M Elliott and R Thomas, 
Public Law 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p 7: ‘within the democratic tradition, the 
purpose of a constitution is… to allocate power in a manner that is regarded as morally acceptable’ (original 
emphasis).  
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constituents’,75 ‘because Parliament has not been extreme’,76 and because Acts of 
Parliament ‘are rarely obviously and egregiously unjust’.77 In short, the UK 
constitution assumes that ‘the worst will not happen in the first place’.78  
  The cases discussed in the third category above are clearly not ‘the worst’ that 
can happen. For reasons mentioned at the start I have chosen not to discuss the 
UK’s attempts to allow the government to gag a newspaper79 and a former spy;80 to 
ban all homosexuals from serving in the military;81 to indefinitely detain foreign 
terrorist suspects;82 to criminalise speech that ‘encourages’ terrorism, even if the 
person making the statement does not intend to encourage terrorism’;83 to ban non-
violent political organisations;84 to sanction some of the most sweeping surveillance 
powers in the Western world.85 And even these examples stop short of a particular 
Rubicon that some of the most senior judges think Parliament should not cross, 
namely a legislative attempt to remove government action affecting individual rights 
from judicial scrutiny.86 But Hammond and Abdul do reveal some home truths about 
the UK constitution. Although free speech is routinely hailed as a hallmark of 
                                                      
75 R Rawlings, ‘Introduction: Sovereignty in Question’, in R Rawlings, P Leyland, and AL Young, 
Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, European, and International Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013) p 1. 
76 I Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London: University of London Press, 1959) p 160; see also G 
Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: the rules and forms of political accountability (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1984) p 9. 
77 Goldsworthy, above n 71, p 69. 
78 M Elliott, ‘The Principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty in Legal, Constitutional, and Political Perspective’ 
in J Jowell, D Oliver, and C O’Cinneide, The Changing Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 8th 
edn, 2015) p 65; Lord Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 MLR 159, p 161: ‘we 
have entrusted our most fundamental liberties to the will of a sovereign Parliament and, taken all in all, 
Parliament has not betrayed this trust’. 
79 Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 274; but overturned by Sunday Times v United Kingdom, 
Judgment, App No 6538/74, A/30, [1979] ECHR 1 (the first time the Strasbourg Court found a decision 
of the highest UK court to be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights).  
80 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No.1) [1987] UKHL 13, [1987] 3 All ER 316; and Attorney 
General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No.2) [1988] UKHL 6 [1988] 3 All E.R. 545; these decisions were deemed 
to be in breach of the ECHR by Observer and Guardian v United Kingdom, App No 13585/88, [1991] ECHR 
49. 
81 R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith [1996] QB 517; case found to have violated the ECHR in Smith and Grady 
v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493. 
82 A and X v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68. 
83 Ss.1 and 2 Terrorism Act 2006. 
84 S.3 Terrorism Act 2000.  
85 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s.87, for instance, authorises the Secretary of State to order the retention 
of communications data for the purpose of preventing or detecting any crime, not just serious crime. 
According to the CJEU, however, only the objective of combating of serious crime is capable of justifying 
data retention: Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Watson at 
[102]. 
86 Jackson v Attorney General, above n 6, Lord Steyn at [102]; Baroness Hale at [159]. 
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democratic society,87 it is ‘residual’ to the common law,88 and far from being 
recognised as an indispensable condition of legitimacy.  
  In the end, the political constitution explains nothing more than the 
Westminster way of doing politics.89 John Austin’s legal positivism, H.L.A. Hart’s 
analytical jurisprudence, A.V. Dicey’s conservative normativism, and John Griffith’s 
functionalism all define law and legality in purely formal terms. Their normative 
blindness is self-serving. They perpetuate the political constitution by focussing only 
on the source of power. They favour representative and responsible government 
over substantive democratic government. They define arbitrariness narrowly as the 
absence of procedure. They equate legitimacy with legality. Their failure to grasp 
political questions as constitutional questions, and questions of legality as questions 
of legitimacy, baffles continental commentators, yet is venerated domestically as 
reflecting the flexible and living constitution.  
  UK constitutional law has not produced an account of democracy beyond 
practical decision-making. Without limits on popular sovereignty, without ground 
rules, with ‘everything up for grabs’, democracy becomes wholly incidental to the 
political constitution. Democracy collapses into the recapitulation of the status quo: 
whatever happens in a democracy is democratic. On this account, Lord Sumption’s 
statement that ‘Parliament may do many things which undermine the democratic 
element of our constitution’,90 and Lord Steyn’s concern in Jackson regarding the 
enactment of ‘oppressive and wholly undemocratic legislation’,91 are contradictions 
in terms. Such a relativistic account views the procedural conditions of periodic and 
competitive elections and effective, equal, and universal participation as the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of democracy, which leaves the account of 
democracy under-determined, under-theorised, and under-valued.  
 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIENCY II:  
THE COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION 
 
The artifice of the common law constitution has been developed in opposition to 
the political constitution. It is animated by similar questions that form the backdrop 
of the present article: what are the limits of legislative supremacy and what are the 
limits of the practice of judicial obedience to statute? In an attempt to counter 
                                                      
87 C Gearty, Civil Liberties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007); D Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights 
in England and Wales (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2002) p 32; Weale, above n 39, p 6. 
88 H Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 5th edn, 2017) pp 12, 104; 
E Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2005) pp 40-41; S Bailey et al 
(eds) Civil Liberties Cases, Materials, & Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6th edn, 2009) p 2. 
89 M Foley, The Politics of the British Constitution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999) p 1; 
Munro, above n 64, p 338. 
90 J Sumption, ‘Judicial and political decision-making: the uncertain boundary - the FA Mann Lecture’ 
(2011) 16(4) JR 301-315, p 314. 
91 Jackson v Attorney General, above n 6, at [102]. 
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orthodoxy with orthodoxy, this model rejects the doctrine of legislative supremacy 
in favour of the ancient common law tradition, which is re-imagined as a higher-
order ersatz constitution.92 The common law, it is claimed, contains a set of moral 
principles, which are transformed into law through the exercise of ‘artificial 
reason’.93 Unformalised and undeclared, the moral principles are said to unite all 
common law jurisdictions and are said to be immune from judicial and 
parliamentary abrogation.94 However, the invocation of mere morality to limit 
Parliament has meant that common lawyers since Coke and Hale have had to accept 
that Parliament retains the formal legal power to limit freedom and act oppressively. 
In the final analysis, the common law advances no more than a moral argument 
about what Parliament ought not to do, and not a constitutional argument about 
what Parliament cannot do.  
  Trevor Allan argues that an extensive conception of the rule of law acts as ‘a 
constitutional principle of real importance, capable of moderating the influence of 
majoritarian politics, especially in times of emergency or stress’.95 The claims of the 
common law offer an alternative account of UK constitutional law. Formal equality 
is replaced with a substantive account that includes moral-turned-legal principles of 
the common law, such as equality, rationality, proportionality, fairness, and basic 
rights.96 Judges are elevated from their previously subordinate role to guardians of 
the common law constitution and of democracy, who assess the content of 
individual rights with reference to moral and ethical principles.97 And the common 
law constitution creates a space for liberal rights and limits on legislative authority 
– in other words, the kind of constitutional debate which the finality of sovereignty 
in the political constitution forecloses by treating it as irrelevant, unnecessary, and a 
waste of political resources.98  
  However, the common law constitution continues to adhere to a pre-
democratic and constitutional form that accepts Parliament’s ability to limit freedom 
by legislation. Allan undoubtedly advances constitutional discourse by connecting 
parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law, and separation of powers to the world of 
politics and morality, which he regards as the pillars of liberty, justice, democracy, 
and legality.99 In so doing, he replaces the political constitution with a moral 
                                                      
92 O Dixon, ‘The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation’ (1957) 31 Australian LJ 240; J 
Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] PL 72; TRS Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of 
British Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the 
Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); above n 5. 
93 E Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London: J. & W.T. Clarke, 1628).  
94 JW Harris, ‘The Privy Council and the Common Law’ (1990) 106 LQR 574; TRS Allan, ‘In Defence of 
the Common Law Constitution: Unwritten Rights as Fundamental Law’ (2009) 22 CLJ 187. 
95 Allan, above n 5, p 2. 
96 Ibid, pp 116, 185, 244.  
97 See also J Steyn, Democracy Through Law: Selected Speeches and Judgements (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004) pp 24-6; 130. 
98 Observation by Foley, above 89, p 4.  
99 Allan, above n 5, p 9. 
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constitution.100 The claim that the common law is the judicially-recognised source 
of parliamentary sovereignty becomes not only factually correct (courts, public 
authorities, and private individuals obey Acts of Parliament) but also morally 
desirable: sovereignty ought to reflect democratic notions of equality as well as a 
constitution ‘rooted in fundamental moral values’.101  
  Drawing on Lon L. Fuller’s theory of moral law that respects the demands of 
human dignity, Allan co-opts liberty and justice to infuse law with moral legitimacy 
and appeals to the reader’s ‘moral and political judgement’.102 The law does not 
command obedience because of its source, e.g. parliamentary sovereignty, but 
because of its substance, which derives from i) the moral integrity of legislation and 
ii) personal responsibility and judgement.103 In shifting the rule of recognition from 
a source-based to a content-based conception, Allan concludes that ‘the sovereignty 
of Parliament is only a manifestation of the sovereignty of law’.104 Statute law is a 
composition of a ‘present tense’ interpretation105 of both the text and of the 
principles of the common law, which makes it in part ‘a product of our moral 
judgement’.106 
  It is an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of analysing the constitution 
through the prism of analytical jurisprudence, and in particular the relationship 
between law and morality, that the key concepts of rule of law, legitimacy, 
democracy, liberty, and free speech all remain under-developed. Although Allan 
asserts the rule of law as a ‘constitutional principle of real importance’ that preserves 
individual autonomy and independence, on closer reading it amounts to no more 
than a guarantee against arbitrary interference.107 As a reviewer of the book notes, 
Allan’s conception of ‘legitimacy is thicker than mere legality, but is nevertheless a 
thin legitimacy’.108 The objections in the previous section notwithstanding, the idea 
of democracy is ‘clearly related’ to parliamentary sovereignty,109 which aligns Allan 
with the dominant tradition. Three presuppositions contribute to the weakness of 
the common law model. First, Allan accepts the principle that ‘a political majority 
may legitimately impose its will on a dissenting minority’ – he questions only the 
extent.110 Second, with the political constitutionalists, he accepts that parliamentary 
democracy and majoritarianism ‘are the appropriate means for settling the content 
of law’.111 Third, he defines liberty in negative terms as that which protects ‘a private 
sphere of thought, deliberation, and action consonant with his dignity as a free and 
                                                      
100 Ibid, p 32. 
101 Allan, above n 5, pp 17, 135; Dixon, above n 92, p 240. 
102 Allan, above n 5, pp 20, 31.  
103 Ibid, pp 39-40. 
104 Ibid, p 33. 
105 Steyn, above n 97, pp 62-3. 
106 Allan, above n 5, p 40. 
107 Ibid, pp 89, 93. 
108 P Scott, ‘Review of: The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law’ (2014) 130 
LQR 162-165, p 164. 
109 Allan, above n 5, pp 17, 120.  
110 Ibid, p 19. 
111 Ibid, p 33.  
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independent citizen’.112 This allows Allan to endorse ‘draconian restrictions on 
personal liberty’ on grounds of overriding interests of public safety113 and with the 
aid of ‘appropriately rigorous requirements of due process or procedural fairness’.114 
Even on a key question, whether Parliament could expressly curtail freedom of 
expression at election time, Allan offers only a weak response, saying it would be ‘a 
matter of opinion’.115 Such subjectivism and relativism hardly amount to a 
principled defence of ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ speech as an essential 
feature of a liberal democratic state.116 
  Allan concludes that egregious legislation (such as bills of attainder or statutes 
permitting the killing of all blue eyed babies) would not qualify as ‘law’ due to the 
absence of ‘generality’: This response provides further evidence of Allan’s thin 
conception of legitimacy: ‘generality’, ‘due process’, and ‘procedural fairness’ are 
criteria of the procedural rule of law conception. Allan invokes standard 
administrative law terminology when he declares that such legislation would be 
‘wholly unreasonable or irrational [and] cannot qualify as a valid law’.117 Contrary to 
Allan’s argument, this technical objection does not suffice to ‘elucidate the features 
of what (in common with most of our fellow citizens) we take to be a legitimate 
scheme of government, worthy of our attention and loyalty’.118 
  To the contrary, the fixation on providing legalistic responses to political 
problems inadvertently plays into the hands of, say, the US Supreme Court in its 
disreputable Dred Scott decision. In that case the Court ruled that the Missouri 
Compromise (1820), which had declared free all territories acquired after the 
creation of the United States, was unconstitutional. The US Supreme Court reached 
this conclusion on the ground that Congress’s prohibition of slave-holding in the 
Western territories deprived Mr Sandford of his slave property without due process 
of law.119 Constitutionally, the decision is problematic for the absence of judicial 
deference and the failure to presume statutory validity. From a democratic 
standpoint, however, the decision stands out for its violations of substantive 
principles, such as liberty and equality. 
  The common lawyers’ equation of the legal constitution with a moral 
constitution is premised on an understanding of public law as ‘rationalist 
metaphysics’ that reveals itself as an ‘aesthetic preference, not an epistemological 
                                                      
112 Allan, above n 5, p 89. 
113 Allan cites R (Corner House Research) v The Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60; [2009] AC 756, per 
Baroness Hale at [53]. 
114 Allan, above n 5, pp 89, 142. 
115 Ibid, p 7. Any account of constitutional law rests on ‘our own opinion, based on a view of constitutional 
practice that we find defensible…’ (at p 19; original emphasis).  
116 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 270. 
117 Allan, above n 5, p 141. 
118 Ibid, p 19. 
119 ‘[An] act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely 
because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who 
had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law’. 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857). 
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advance’.120 This approach fails to understand the constitution as a site of political 
contestation. Instead of justifying claims about parliamentary sovereignty on 
grounds of history or principles of morality, they ought instead to be ‘rooted in an 
appreciation of the nature of the contemporary political condition’.121 For Loughlin 
it means appreciating the autonomy of the political sphere and of droit politique. In 
the next section, I argue that it means appreciating the requirements of democracy. 
 
 
 
DEMOCRACY AS THE LEGITIMATING CONDITION 
 
The existing constitutional models based on parliamentary sovereignty and the 
common law fail in their accounts of democracy. The political constitution 
simultaneously under-theorizes democracy, by reducing it to an electoral condition 
or majoritarian procedure, and overextends it by treating popular and parliamentary 
sovereignty as legally limitless. Without democratic guarantees, freedom includes 
the freedom to change or abolish the social and legal order. The constitution does 
not contain pre-determined rules, but simply facilitates the process of making new 
rules or keeping existing ones. Democracy’s key index is fairness of procedure, 
which too is subordinated to Parliament’s overriding legislative authority.  
  The common law constitution at least recognises that democracy contains 
biases in favour of individual freedoms and against arbitrary government and, 
insofar as its form is republican, against political domination. These biases 
potentially clash with the prevailing conceptions of sovereignty as absolute, of the 
constitution as political, and of democracy as purely procedural. The common law’s 
account today is distinctly liberal and moral, but it is not distinctly democratic. 
  By contrast, I propose an assessment that enquires into the extent to which 
statutes, policy, and case law support an ideal of politically active citizenship. In a 
seminal speech marking the bicentennial of the US Constitution in 1987, Thurgood 
Marshall, the first African American member of the US Supreme Court, gave credit 
not to the ‘defective’ vision of the founding fathers, but ‘to those who refused to 
acquiesce in outdated notions of “liberty,” “justice,” and “equality,” and who strived 
to better them’.122 In the same mould, UK constitutional scholars need to 
supplement their established criteria of legal validity with different conditions of 
political legitimacy. Those who seek to justify the decisions in Hammond, Abdul and 
similar cases by virtue of their legal consistency with the Public Order Act 1986 fail 
to notice that these decisions are unjust, wrong-headed, and not just unnecessary in 
but incompatible with a democratic society.  
  Without the connection between formal legality and substantive legitimacy, the 
absolutist conceptions of parliamentary sovereignty and popular democracy become 
                                                      
120 M Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp 147-148.  
121 M Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p 272. 
122 Remarks of Thurgood Marshall at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law 
Association in Maui, Hawaii, May 6, 1987. 
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indistinguishable from Franz Neumann’s definition of dictatorship as ‘the rule of a 
person or a group of persons who arrogate to themselves and monopolize power in 
the state, exercising it without restraint’.123 The Westminster model ironically ends 
up sharing the same starting point of legally unlimited power as dictatorship. It is 
this coupling of absolute parliamentary sovereignty with a minimalist conception of 
democracy as electoral and majoritarian that gives rise to the tension between legality 
and legitimacy that underpins oppressive law and policy.  
  Three steps need to be made in order for the UK to embrace a concept of 
democracy that transcends its electoral-representative starting point. First, 
democracy must not be relativized as a ‘complex’ and ‘contested’ concept. The claim 
that democracy defies definition and is susceptible to wholly open-ended 
interpretations is a widely-accepted truism that ought to be rejected as false.124 The 
rule of law is a similarly complex and contested concept. Without agreement on its 
meaning, it is perfectly possible, and indeed is a current trend, for authoritarian 
regimes to proffer formal acceptance of the baselines of the rule of law (legal 
certainty and stability over economic rights) and basic democracy (elections, 
representation, and majoritarianism) but to reject openly the requirements of civil 
rights and political freedoms.125 
  In a second step, democracy needs to be distinguished from precepts held in 
common with liberalism, principally equality and freedom. First, can equality be 
shown to be distinctly democratic? Its negative and formal sense privileges a purely 
abstract and civic conception to the detriment of material (social and economic) 
interests. Material equality, however, could also be realised in non-democratic states. 
For Nadia Urbinati, therefore, formal political equality is the reference point in 
relation to which citizens assess the political process of democratic 
representation.126 She distinguishes two kinds of formal equality, already present in 
Athens. Isonomia relates to strict equality before the law, which is satisfied through 
representation and the rule of law, and may also be found in non-democracies.127 
Isegoria, on the other hand, concerns an equal right to access the political assemblies 
and to support or oppose laws or policies. This conception concerns judgement and 
interpretation in complex and plural societies.128 It relies on participation and active 
citizenship. As a result, ‘this equality is exquisitely political and democratic; in fact, 
it exists only in a democracy’.129 For Urbinati, therefore, democratic equality is 
                                                      
123 F Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State (New York: Free Press, 1957) p 233. 
124 Heinze, above n 15, pp 43-44. 
125 T Ginsburg and A Simpser (eds) Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 
2014); T Ginsburg and T Moustafa (eds) Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
126 N Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2006), p 6.  
127 Ibid, p 43. 
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129 Ibid, p 43. 
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political equality, i.e. participation and active citizenship, which provides the link 
with freedom.  
  Second, is ‘freedom’ a distinctly democratic concept? The neo-Kantian ideal 
manifests itself, according to Hans Kelsen, in the historical ‘struggle for democracy’, 
which he interprets as a ‘struggle for political freedom; that is, for popular 
participation in the legislature and executive’.130 Franz Neumann also places ‘the 
activist element of political freedom’ at the heart of the democratic political system, 
the essence of which does not lie in majoritarian decision-making, ‘but in the making 
of politically responsible decisions’ and in ‘large-scale social changes maximising the 
freedom of man’.131 According to Giovanni Sartori, freedom is the constitutive 
element of liberal democracy, although not necessarily of democracy as such.132 In 
other words, these theorists collapse a democratic conception of freedom into a 
liberal conception. Unlike Urbinati, who privileges equality over liberty, Sartori 
claims that liberal democracies strive to achieve ‘equality through liberty’:133 ‘From 
liberty we are free to go on to equality; from equality, we are not free to get back to 
liberty’.134 But both Urbinati and Sartori reduce democracy to the liberal values of 
political equality and individual freedom, neither of which are, however, distinctly 
democratic.  
  The final liberal account of democracy stems from Ronald Dworkin, who 
argues that legitimate majority rule must necessarily require the existence of 
structural conditions above and beyond the principle of majority. A majority cannot, 
using democratic means, abolish future elections or disenfranchise a minority.135 
Dworkin endorses a constitutional conception of democracy that consists of three 
conditions: i) ‘a majority or plurality of people’; ii) ‘all citizens have the moral 
independence necessary to participate in the political decision as free moral agents’; 
iii) ‘the political process is such as to treat all citizens with equal concern’.136 The 
problem is that these structural conditions correspond to basic liberal principles of 
popular sovereignty, political participation, and citizen equality. None of the criteria 
is manifestly democratic. Moreover, Dworkin does not distinguish between 
different types of democracies (e.g. Western, transitional, authoritarian etc.). 
Instead, Dworkin’s ‘naïve universalism’ lies in inducing absolute principles of 
democracy from US constitutional principles.137 
  The third and final step is to theorise democracy on its own terms. Jürgen 
Habermas rejects Dworkin’s liberal-individual, and its rival republican-
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communitarian,138 model of democracy in favour of a ‘procedural’ one. Sovereignty 
is generally conceived, with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as harnessing the general will of 
a collective subject. However, in Habermas’ terms popular sovereignty becomes 
‘desubstantialised’, anonymised, and realised ‘through the communicative 
presuppositions and procedures of an institutionally differentiated opinion- and 
will-formation’.139 By forcing popular sovereignty into ‘subjectless forms of 
communication’ and democratic procedures140 Habermas wrestles the concept from 
Rousseau and secures it as ‘the hinge between the system of rights and the 
construction of a constitutional democracy’.141 ‘The democratic process bears the entire 
burden of legitimation’ by securing the private autonomy of legal subjects through 
individual rights and their public autonomy through communicative freedoms.142 
  Habermas’ subjectless forms of communication have a liberal as well as a 
democratic component. On the one hand, they form the legal foundation for a free 
and open process of participation for constructing political will and opinion, which 
is indispensable for democratic freedom. On the other hand, they form the 
agreement on which to disagree by cutting short the infinite search for validity and 
justification criteria. The rights of communication determine the democratic 
character of the state and its laws and practices, but are themselves immune from 
democratic deliberation. 
  Both Dworkin and Habermas reject the simplistic maxim of the political 
constitution that any law properly enacted by the legislature is presumptively 
democratic. Instead of Dworkin’s structural conditions, Habermas inserts his 
discourse principle according to which ‘the only law that counts as legitimate is one 
that could be rationally accepted by all citizens in a discursive process of opinion- 
and will-formation.’143 This axiom bears a striking resemblance to Rawls’ ‘justice as 
fairness’, which ‘may be shared by citizens as a basis of a reasoned, informed, and 
willing political agreement’.144 But where does this leave the expression of 
viewpoints that are not subject to rational acceptance or reasoned and informed 
political participation? What implications do these positions have, for instance, for 
the government’s definition of extremism as ‘the vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty 
and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’?145 
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  What makes these ‘British’ values fundamental is, presumably, that they are 
susceptible to rational acceptance by all (current and future) citizens as a basis for 
reasoned and informed political agreement, in accordance with Habermas and 
Rawls. But what about those advocates who are vocally and actively opposed to 
such values? Is there not a danger that, as one newspaper headline put it, ‘laws 
against “extremism” risk criminalising us all’?146 
  Eric Heinze’s claims are more targeted. He does not refer to all democracies, 
but only to longstanding, stable, and prosperous democracies (LSPDs). He does not 
argue for an absolute freedom of speech, and he accepts many familiar limits on 
expression.147 His argument is limited to the expression of ‘viewpoints’ aired within 
open, public discourse, including irrational, obnoxious, and even dangerous 
worldviews. Crucially, the expression of such views ought to be protected as the 
prerogative of every citizen, rather than as a liberal right or as an individual freedom. 
He proposes elements of citizenship, which, unlike standard corpuses of individual 
rights or freedoms, can never legitimately be subject to legislative or judicial 
balancing of interests on specifically democratic grounds. Governments may 
legitimately impose certain viewpoint-neutral restraints, for instance regarding 
commercial fraud, courtroom perjury, or official secrets, and ‘time, manner, and 
place restrictions’.148 However, Heinze’s central thesis is that ‘the most distinctly 
democratic’ manifestation of free expression is viewpoint absolutism within public 
discourse,149 and that ‘no conceivable abridgement of that citizen prerogative could 
ever be deemed to promote democracy’.150  
  If Heinze’s argument is correct then the real threat to the specifically 
democratic element of a state—as opposed to threats to any state simply as a state, 
such as war, famine, or environmental pollution—stems from laws seeking to gag 
the citizens’ prerogative to speak – which is precisely the issue in Hammond, Abdul, 
and related cases. Similarly, from a civil liberties perspective, retaining the more 
standard constructs of higher-order rights, David Feldman rejects any suggestion 
that democracy assumes an unhindered power on the part of lawmakers to abridge 
such rights ‘it would be perverse to argue that there is anything undemocratic about 
a restriction on the capacity of decision-makers to interfere with the rights which 
are fundamental to democracy itself’.151 
  It does not follow from the above that any limitation of the expression of a 
viewpoint, for instance through hate speech bans, would wholly diminish the 
legitimacy of that democracy. Although bans are illegitimate within LSPDs, they 
delegitimise democracy only pro tanto. ‘The legitimacy of the entire democracy is not 
overcome by one defect. Nor, however, does a democracy’s overall legitimacy 
suffice to overcome the defect’.152 
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  All three theories of democracy, by Dworkin, Habermas, and Heinze, serve as 
a better vantage point for the discussion of UK constitutional law than the ‘political’ 
and ‘common law’ models. All three argue in unison that certain norms must be 
presupposed in any account of contemporary democratic authority and must lie 
beyond majoritarian politics. However, the three accounts ultimately differ. 
Dworkin’s account of democracy is congruent with the liberal tradition that regards 
the constitution is a corset for those who wield power, and which conceives rights 
negatively, individually, and instrumentally. More abstractly, Habermas rests 
democracy in the communicative conditions necessary for political participation and 
will-formation. More concretely, Heinze argues for the expression of all viewpoints 
as a prerogative of citizens in LSPDs. Neither Habermas nor Heinze view the 
constitutive norms of democracy as ‘corsets’ on a free political discourse. Instead, 
such norms substantiate ‘the necessary condition for having any discourse at all 
about how purposes are to be fulfilled in that society’.153 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Not all violations of constitutional principles or fundamental rights need to be 
assessed with reference to democracy. Some incursions in the area of human rights 
and civil liberties (blanket discrimination or indefinite detention, or deportation 
which compromises the absolute prohibition on torture, and broad police powers) 
may be analysed in relation to the rule of law and liberal constitutionalism. But article 
cannot draw boundary lines that identify the precise conditions when specific issues 
such as electronic surveillance, extreme speech, or indefinite detention cease to be 
compatible with the principle of democracy. In addition. compliance with 
devolution, and membership of the European Union and Council of Europe may 
be scrutinised with respect to Elliott’s useful concept of constitutionality.154  
  However, the prevention or criminalisation of offensive, obnoxious, or 
dangerous speech, without any security implications, raises separate and 
conspicuous issues for the UK as a contemporary democracy. The cases of 
Hammond and Abdul are paradigmatic. The defendants were arrested and fined for 
airing their personal views on same-sex relationships and the actions of UK soldiers 
in Iraq. The problem was not with how they said it; it was with what they said. If 
‘there simply is no way that the speaker can express this core belief without risking 
such offence’, then the message is very clear ‘that society will not tolerate the public 
expression of his core beliefs’.155 Viewpoint absolutism is, according to Heinze, the 
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irreducible core of democratic legitimacy.156 Criminalising the expression of 
viewpoints, therefore, resonates throughout the legal and political system as a 
general challenge to parliamentary sovereignty and the common law, and as a 
particular challenge to democratic legitimacy.  
  Asking what democracy requires in Hammond, Abdul, and similar cases, is more 
principled than trading-off freedom of expression against the need to maintain 
public order within the framework of liberal constitutionalism. Criminalising non-
violent free speech may not be against UK law. But it ought to contravene Art 10 
ECHR, and it most certainly contravenes the criteria of democratic legitimacy. 
Hammond and Abdul illustrate not only damage done to individual rights and 
freedoms, but to the democratic credentials of the polis itself.157  
  The legality of legislation will always depend on sovereign authority and formal 
procedure (highest might), but its legitimacy ought to derive from persuasion and 
social generality (highest right). The democratic legitimacy of laws stems from a 
complex constellation of requirements and conditions that no longer involves 
popular sovereignty alone, but also basic rights and liberties; not an overriding 
concern with public order, but an overriding concern with freedom; not just formal 
participatory rights, but an inclusive process of opinion- and will-formation; and not 
just the negative, individualist, and liberal view of freedom as non-interference 
guaranteed by the rule of law, but the social and public conception of non-
domination in a free, civic, and democratic society. All of this is known. The 
untechnical phrase ‘constitutional law’ does not reflect it; Parliament’s unqualified 
right to enact whatever law it thinks fit undermines it.  
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